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Abstract: 
Scholars and practitioners have renewed their interest in recognizing and designing restorative 
justice programs. Although these programs often provide successful outcomes, we know 
relatively little about why they work. Reintegrative shaming theory provides a lens by which to 
explain successful outcomes. This study uses over three years of direct observations to examine 
the practice of reintegrative shaming in a mental health court (MHC). We organize our findings 
around four primary components of reintegrative shaming outlined by Makkai and Braithwaite: 
respectful disapproval, disapproving the behavior rather than the individual, rejecting deviance 
as a master status, and ceremonial decertifications of deviance. Our data demonstrate that 
reintegrative shaming in MHC is largely accomplished through interactions with the judge, 
although the unique organization of the MHC, including their small caseloads, use of separate 
dockets, and pre-court team meetings, advance the court’s use of reintegrative shaming. 
Keywords: reintegrative shaming | mental health court | restorative justice | problem-solving 
courts | theory 
Article: 
Restorative justice programs, though far from normative, have received renewed attention and 
implementation in recent decades (Braithwaite, 2002). These programs often demonstrate 
beneficial outcomes, including feelings of satisfaction among the parties involved and decreased 
recidivism among participating offenders; however, focusing on outcomes hinders our 
developing an understanding about why these successes occur, which is crucial to advancing our 
knowledge and understanding about how these programs operate.1 
Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming theory helps explain the successes of restorative justice 
programs (Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2001; Braithwaite, 
1989, 1999, 2004; Weitekamp & Kerner, 2002). The theory suggests that shaming can either be 
stigmatizing or reintegrative. Stigmatizing shame, which often occurs in the traditional criminal 
justice practices, involves labeling offenders as deviant and isolating them from the law-abiding 
community. In contrast, reintegrative shaming focuses on condemning the deviant behavior 
without condemning the individual. Furthermore, the reintegrative shaming process is finite and 
includes efforts to respect the offender throughout the process, and to ultimately accept her or 
him back into the community through words or gestures of forgiveness. When shaming is 
reintegrative, offenders are less likely to recidivate because feelings of community and 
responsibility are strengthened (Braithwaite, 1989; Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994). 
Restorative justice programs are varied and include a wide range of practices such as family 
conferences, victim–offender mediations, healing and sentencing circles, victim-impact panels, 
and community reparative boards. In this article, we identify mental health court (MHC) as a 
restorative justice effort practicing reintegrative shaming. The MHC is a post-booking diversion 
program that utilizes the treatment and services available in a given community to divert 
mentally ill defendants out of the cycle of incarceration by motivating them to connect with 
treatment or services (Almquist & Dodd, 2009). Although MHCs vary in their specific 
organization, including the type of dismissal program used, types of criminal offenses permitted, 
and acceptance of clients with co-occurring conditions, these courts are generally organized 
around the belief that legal responses should emphasize healing and treatment (Menkel-Meadow, 
2007; Strang & Braithwaite, 2000) and treat offenders respectfully so as to minimize subsequent 
criminal acts (King, 2008; Nolan, 2009). To implement these efforts, MHCs rely on a team of 
persons from differing specialties and encourage the participants to maintain supportive, 
prosocial relationships. 
Relying on observational data, we find that MHC personnel use techniques of reintegrative 
shaming that reflect restorative justice principles and practices. Below, we review reintegrative 
shaming theory and discuss the theory’s link to restorative justice. Next, we detail the 
organization and processes underlying MHC proceedings generally before more specifically 
describing the MHC setting that is the subject of this research. Finally, we present findings from 
our observational data, and conclude by discussing how the MHC model might further adopt 
restorative justice practices. 
Conceptual Framework 
Reintegrative Shaming Theory 
Reintegrative shaming theory merges several criminological traditions around the concept of 
shame and, in doing so, attempts to explain crime and criminal recidivism by focusing on the 
degree and form of social disapproval. The theory distinguishes between two forms of shame—
stigmatizing (disintegrative) and reintegrative—and predicts that, stigmatizing shame increases 
the likelihood of crime, while reintegrative shame reduces criminal behavior recidivism (Ahmed 
et al., 2001; Braithwaite, 1989). 
Stigmatizing shame involves labeling offenders as deviant and isolating them from social ties 
and community. When this occurs, the deviant label becomes a master status, legitimate 
opportunities are blocked, and offenders may seek out similarly labeled individuals and continue 
their deviant behaviors. In contrast, reintegrative shaming distinguishes the criminal or offensive 
behavior from the individual. Although reintegrative shaming can be harsh and degrading, the 
behavior is punished or condemned without subjugating the individual. Reintegrative shaming, 
then, allows for the expression of disappointment for the behavior (shaming), while 
simultaneously expressing respect for the individual offender to assure that social ties to others 
are not severed (Ahmed et al., 2001; Braithwaite, 1984). Importantly, reintegrative shaming is 
also finite, and it ceases with words and/or gestures of reconciliation, forgiveness, and inclusion. 
Once punishment is completed, ceremonial decertification of the deviant act encourages the 
individual to acknowledge her or his acceptance back into the community. 
The Use of Reintegrative Shaming in Restorative Justice Practices 
The principles of restorative justice have been central to the development of numerous criminal 
justice programs, but the perspective does not clarify any particular mechanism(s) to explain how 
restorative programs work. Although restorative justice processes predate Braithwaite’s work 
(Van Ness & Strong, 2006), restorative justice practices employ components of reintegrative 
shaming theory (Braithwaite, Ahmed, & Braithwaite, 2006). Thus, in describing the relationship 
between reintegrative shaming and restorative justice programs, it is most accurate to suggest, as 
Braithwaite and others have, that the theory offers an explanation for why these practices work 
(Ahmed et al., 2001; Braithwaite, 2004). 
Restorative justice practices encourage the parties involved in a criminal act to express their 
perspectives in the hopes that the offender will realize the consequences of their behavior and 
relationships within the community can be restored (McCold, 2000; Zehr, 1995). Facilitators 
guide the process so that the victim and offender have opportunities to voice their concerns. This 
dialogue is essential to implementing restorative justice (Presser & Van Voorhis, 2002) and is a 
means by which the offender’s behavior is shamed. Shaming, then, acts as a sanction whereby 
the offender is held accountable for criminal acts, which supports others’ arguments that 
restorative justice and reparative responses are not entirely mutually exclusive (e.g., Daly, 
2002; Walgrave, 2000, 2013). Still, because this shaming occurs in the presence of family, 
friends, or other supporters who offer words or gestures of forgiveness, the offender’s perception 
of shame functions to encourage him or her to recognize the gravity and consequences of 
offending. Following this shaming process, reintegration of the offender to the community 
ensues (Braithwaite, 1989). 
By juxtaposing restorative efforts observed in juvenile court conferences with Garfinkel’s 
(1956) concept of the degradation ceremonies, Braithwaite and Mugford (1994) identify several 
characteristics associated with successful reintegration ceremonies. Although the characteristics 
illustrate various observed practices, four components are particularly salient in linking 
reintegrativing shaming to restorative justice efforts: using language and gestures to signify 
respectful disapproval of criminal behavior, emphasizing a disapproval of the criminal behavior 
rather than the individual, encouraging a rejection of deviance as a master status, and carrying 
out ceremonial decertifications of deviance. 
MHC 
MHCs are a type of problem-solving court and have grown tremendously—from only three 
courts in 1990s to nearly 400 MHCs in the United States today (Goodale, Callahan, & Steadman, 
2013). These courts offer an alternative to traditional court processes. Their goal is to divert 
offenders out of the criminal justice system and link them with treatment or services that will 
alter the underlying social or psychological problems associated with the criminal behavior. The 
court personnel use the authority of the court to provide sanctions and incentives that encourage 
positive changes in the offender’s life, including improving mental health functioning. 
MHCs vary in organization and implementation (Almquist & Dodd, 2009). Some courts utilize 
deferred adjudication whereby defendants are required to plea guilty or nolo contendere prior to 
enrolling in the court, but following satisfactory completion of court mandates, the charges are 
dismissed. Other courts operate on pretrial diversion, which removes the defendant from 
traditional criminal prosecution prior to entering a plea. In addition, some MHCs accept 
offenders charged with only certain types of crimes. For example, the Court may decide to 
restrict enrollment to individuals with misdemeanor charges, while others may admit offenders 
charged with more serious offenses, including felonies and violent crimes. Finally, MHCs differ 
in the degree to which they accept participants who are comorbid for substance use disorders. 
Although participants with co-occurring conditions are not uncommon in MHC, courts do vary 
in their standard for such admissions. 
Despite some differences across MHCs, the courts have some similar characteristics that 
distinguish them from traditional criminal courts (Almquist & Dodd, 2009; Porter, Rempel, & 
Mansky, 2010). First, MHCs rely on a non-adversarial team approach. Criminal justice and 
mental health practitioners work collaboratively to develop and monitor treatment plans for each 
participant and encourage the participant to progress through the program. Although the exact 
composition of the court team varies across courts, MHC teams generally include a judge, a 
prosecuting attorney, a defense attorney, and treatment service professionals. Second, MHCs 
maintain a separate docket and select cases that are eligible for enrollment. As mentioned above, 
the eligibility criteria may differ across courts, but selection of participants is determined by the 
court team members. Third, each participant must agree to comply with enhanced judicial 
supervision, including following an individualized treatment regimen. Individualized treatment 
plans may include attending a treatment program, meeting with a mental health professional, 
submitting to drug screenings, conforming to a medication regimen, or offering some form of 
restitution. Finally, participants who are compliant with court mandates for a specified period of 
time successfully complete the court process (i.e., graduate). Noncompliant participants are 
terminated from the MHC and either have a judgment of guilt entered against them or are 
returned to traditional criminal court for adjudication, depending on which type of dismissal 
program the MHC uses. 
A fundamental goal of MHC is to reduce criminal recidivism, and some research suggests that 
MHCs effectively reduce rates of re-offending (e.g., Dirks-Linhorst & Linhorst, 2012; Herinckx, 
Swart, Ama, Dolezal, & King, 2005; Hiday & Ray, 2010; McNiel & Binder, 2007; Moore & 
Hiday, 2006). However, because of ethical issues surrounding the denial of treatment and 
services to those who need it, evaluations of MHCs have relied on quasi-experimental research 
designs by comparing MHC participant outcomes to those of a matched group of defendants not 
enrolled in MHC (e.g., Christy, Poythress, Boothroyd, Petrila, & Mehra, 2005; McNiel & 
Binder, 2007), by examining defendants who were eligible but not referred or enrolled in MHC 
(e.g., Moore & Hiday, 2006; Steadman, Redlich, Callahan, Robbins, & Vesselinov, 2011), and 
by investigating changes in arrests or jail days before and after MHC participation (e.g., Dirks-
Linhorst & Linhorst, 2012; Frailing, 2010; Herinckx et al., 2005; Hiday & Ray, 2010; Trupin & 
Richards, 2003). Although the link between court participation and recidivism reduction is not 
definitive, Sarteschi, Vaughn, and Kim’s (2011) meta-analysis concludes that MHCs are a 
moderately effective intervention on criminal behavior. 
Assessments of MHCs across various spatial and temporal contexts and that apply varying 
services and treatments reveal some consistency in successful outcomes leaving researchers 
interested in identifying common mechanisms that may be able to explain why these successes 
occur. With regards to this line of inquiry, researchers have discovered that MHC participants 
perceive high levels of procedural justice (Poythress, Petrila, McGaha, & Boothroyd, 2002; 
Wales, Hiday, & Ray, 2010), especially as compared with defendants in traditional court 
(Poythress et al., 2002). Procedural justice explains that persons who perceive legal decision 
making and treatment as fair will be motivated toward self-regulation in the future (Tyler, 2006). 
Although conceptually distinct, this perspective is consistent with several components of 
reintegrative shaming theory, including the notion of respectful disapproval (Braithwaite, 
2004; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001). 
The Current Study 
Knowledge about MHC processes is crucial to developing an understanding about the successes 
(and failures) of the program, and although such examinations may be useful for subsequent 
research on the causes of successful reentry and recidivism, observational assessments of court 
interactions is worthy of separate investigation. The current study details the use of reintegrative 
shaming in MHC using over three years of observational data. By focusing on the practices and 
interactions that take place within the court rather than criminal justice outcomes, we reveal 
MHC as a restorative justice program that uses four primary components of reintegrative 
shaming: respectful disapproval, disapproving the behavior rather than the individual, rejecting 
deviance as a master status, and ceremonial decertifications of deviance. 
Method 
Observational Setting 
The MHC we observe is located in a midsized city in the southeastern United States and was 
established through collaboration with advocacy groups, treatment providers, and local court 
personnel. The court had been in operation for nearly a decade when we began our study. Earlier 
evaluations of this court find that participation in this MHC is associated with reduced criminal 
recidivism during court participation and after exit (Hiday & Ray, 2010; Moore & Hiday, 2006) 
and the MHC proceedings contain more elements of reintegrative shaming than traditional court 
in the same area, even when the same judge was observed presiding in both court contexts (Ray, 
Dollar, & Thames, 2011). 
The MHC accepts criminal misdemeanor and non-violent felony cases and relies on pretrial 
diversion, so while participating in MHC, arrest charges are placed in abeyance. Nine court 
personnel make up the court team. They include a presiding judge, an assistant district attorney 
(ADA), two defense attorneys, two mental health case managers, two probation officers, and a 
court administrator. Most of the cases handled in this court are referred by a judge or the ADA; 
however, law enforcement, attorneys, or treatment providers can also refer a case to this MHC. 
The ADA initially determines whether or not the offender will be accepted into the MHC, but 
following this acceptance, the offender undergoes a diagnostic assessment at a community 
mental health center. Persons deemed eligible for this MHC must have a mental health diagnosis. 
Most participants have Axis 1 disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar, anxiety, or depression, 
but the court also accepts some offenders with developmental disabilities and a “dual diagnosis” 
of mental illness and substance abuse. 
If the defendant is deemed appropriate for enrollment and agrees to participate, she or he is 
added to the court’s docket. A treatment plan is individually developed for each participant. The 
plan, which is reviewed and approved by all team members, details the services, medical 
treatment, and expectations for each defendant, including requirements regarding the 
participant’s attendance at medical appointments and group sessions, complying with medication 
regimes, avoiding additional criminal behaviors, retaining stable housing, and participating in 
school or work-related activities. 
Participants are ordered to return to open court sessions each month for compliance audits. These 
court proceedings last approximately 2 to 3 hours and are used to publicly evaluate each 
participant’s compliance with treatment, service, and other court mandates. To successfully 
complete or graduate from the program, the defendant must remain compliant with the court’s 
mandates for a specified amount of time, usually 6 to 12 months depending on the participant’s 
treatment needs and severity of criminal charge(s). 
Analytic Strategy 
Our preliminary interest was to openly observe the routine operations and interactions of the 
court to identify patterned behaviors and responses of any and all parties involved in the court 
processes. Each author attended each monthly court session. We used a grounded approach in 
our initial observations (Charmaz, 2001; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) noting our initial impressions, 
sensory details, verbal and gesturing expressions, and reactions to events (Emerson, Fretz, & 
Shaw, 1995). Approximately three months into our observations, we reviewed our field notes 
and collectively agreed that our observations were strikingly consistent with Braithwaite’s 
reintegrative shaming. 
Each author continued to attend monthly MHC sessions for approximately three years. No 
structured observation guide or checklist was utilized. Rather, we recorded individual notes 
primarily centering on observations of shaming but including other observations as well. On-site 
field notes were kept relatively brief in order to maximize our ability to watch and listen to court 
interactions. Immediately following each court session, we separately created expanded field 
notes, which included analytically based reflections. After these elaborated notes were 
completed, we jointly reviewed specific notations and general observations. Our observations 
were highly comparable. There were instances, however, where one author may have noted an 
exchange not captured in the other author’s notes. In these cases, the researcher who had not 
originally noted the exchange verbalized her or his conceptualization of the event. In each 
instance, it mirrored the other observer’s reflection. The high degree of comparability among the 
researchers is likely due to our familiarity with extant theoretical and empirical work on 
reintegrative shaming. 
Findings 
In the following section, we organize and present our findings around four components of 
reintegrative shaming identified by Makkai and Braithwaite (1994). Although these components 
are highly interrelated and often overlap, our observations emphasize particular instances that 
most embody these characteristics of reintegrative shaming. We cite examples of MHC 
proceedings that illustrate (a) respectful disapproval of criminal behavior, (b) disapproval of the 
criminal behavior rather than the individual, (c) rejecting deviance as a master status, and (d) 
using ceremonial decertifications of deviance (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). 
Respectful Disapproval 
Respect of the participant is embedded in the MHC’s organization and atmosphere. The non-
adversarial team approach and maintaining a relatively small caseload allows the MHC 
personnel to devote time to each participant, and monthly status hearings help the court 
personnel become familiar with each participant as a person rather than a case or docket number. 
The MHC also operates in a relatively organized and predictable manner. The MHC participant 
arrives at court with the assurance that her or his attorney will be present, the prosecutor will be 
ready, and the case will be heard. 
Decision-making about the court’s reactions to the participant’s progress or retreat is largely 
handled in a pre-court team meeting that takes place prior to the public court proceedings, so the 
judge uses open court time to develop rapport, engage participants in conversations, and offer 
words of praise, encouragement, or admonishment. Speaking directly to the participant, the judge 
forgoes the use of legal jargon and focuses on conversing with the participant about personal 
matters, including stability or changes in the participant’s residence, job, and/or relational status. 
The MHC experience can last a year or more, and MHC team members often demonstrate 
mutual relationships of caring and respect with participants. This is important to recognize since 
Braithwaite proposes that reintegrative shaming is more effective when it comes from those 
whom the participant respects (Braithwaite, 1989, 2004). Wales and colleagues (2010) suggest 
that procedural justice is largely the result of respectful interactions between the MHC judge and 
the participant. Our observations consistently reveal the presence of such respectful interactions. 
We regularly note that the judge engaging participants in polite conversation, especially when 
explaining court decisions, asking the participant about her or his own decision to participate in 
court, and when listening to the participant’s concerns about court mandates. In fact, the judge 
usually starts the court session with words of encouragement, saying, for example, 
Each one of you are [sic] unique and deserve a quality life. There are no failures in this 
courtroom. There is an opportunity to hold your own outcome. We are here to balance 
accountability and support. Accountability means that you need to make your group meetings, 
follow the law, respect yourself and others, and be honest. Support means that you have to 
continue coming here for help, so that you can have the life you deserve. And what you deserve 
is to be safe, sober, and happy. 
We further observe that after each participant spoke with the judge, the judge thanks the 
participant for coming to court at the end of the exchange. Even when done briefly, this 
expression articulates a level of gratitude for the participant’s attendance. 
When a participant was compliant with court mandates, the judge congratulates and speaks to her 
or his positive achievements. In a particular instance when referring to a participant’s progress 
and commitment to treatment, the judge states: 
I hear you’ve had a really good month. You’ve been attending your meetings and doing really 
well, and got a new place to live. You should respect yourself for that. You should certainly be 
proud of yourself. You deserve it. 
The exchange not only indicates that the judge is pleased with the past month compliance but 
also suggests that the participant should respect and be proud of his progress. 
Disapproving the Behavior, Not the Individual 
The judge often expresses disapproval of behavior, albeit respectfully, to the participants rather 
than expressing disapproval or condemnation of the individual. Expressions of behavioral 
disapproval are particularly notable when the participants are noncompliant with the court’s 
orders, and since very few clients are consistently compliant throughout the MHC process, we 
frequently noted the judge communicating such disapproval. Our data indicate that the MHC 
team recognizes that they are trying to change longstanding patterns of criminal, antisocial, or 
otherwise resistant behavior and thus allow for some degree of noncompliance. In fact, during 
MHC hearings the judge acknowledges that they do not expect “perfection” and that they 
“expect some slip-ups” early on in the process (Ray et al., 2011). 
Even though the judge is aware of noncompliant behaviors because of discussions with MHC 
team members prior to the monthly court proceedings, the judge asks the participant questions 
about her or his progress and activities. Rather than accusing the participant of noncompliant 
behavior outright, then, the judge provides the participant an opportunity to voice her or his past 
month’s experience(s). In nearly all cases we observe, most participants move their head down or 
to the side or look at their attorney suggesting the participant is ashamed and embarrassed to tell 
the judge of their troubled month in open court (i.e., in the presence of all other participants and 
court personnel). The judge often replies by telling the participant that she or he “needs to get 
serious” and “stay focused,” or gives verbal warnings that the participant may be sent back to 
traditional criminal court and relinquish the support services provided through MHC (“This is 
your last chance,” “We can’t keep you in here if you don’t want to get healthy”). The judge 
follows these statements of disapproval with statements of acceptance. For example, in one 
instance, the judge tells a participant who had been noncompliant for two consecutive months, 
“If you mess up again, you’re out,” but follows by saying “We don’t expect you to be perfect, 
but we do expect you try your hardest and to let us know what we can do to help you.” 
Following this exchange, the judge requests that those in the court room join in applauding the 
participant for encouragement. 
One of the most apparent examples of disapproval of behavior happened when one participant, 
who had been enrolled in the court for nearly a year, registered a positive drug screen. The judge 
states, “I hate your behavior. I hate that you used drugs. But I still love you.” Similar messages 
of hating behavior but not the person are frequent in the court and clearly support how 
behavior—but not the individual—is the subject of disapproval. The judge also regularly tells 
participants that they “deserve better.” For example, in talking with a noncompliant participant 
the judge states, “We are here because we want to help you. We can accept some mistakes 
because we believe that you deserve a better life.” 
Interestingly, the judge attempts to identify with participant noncompliance as a way to relate to 
the behavior. For example, one judge often told participants who refuse to take medications 
about his own struggles with medication: 
I have dangerously high blood pressure. It’s so high that I have to take medication, and if I don’t 
take my medication, I might not be here next month. I won’t be here for my wife or my family, 
and that scares me, and it scares them. We both need to take our stuff not only because it’s 
important to us, but because there are people who care about us. 
The above examples illustrate ways that the MHC judge uses dialogue to point out the 
participant’s noncompliance but also recognizes that the individual should have an opportunity to 
move beyond this behavior(s). Consistent with reintegrative shaming, the sanctioning does not 
focus on controlling behaviors but on building encouragement so that the individual sees 
themselves as something other than an offender, because doing so allows him or her to 
discontinue such behaviors in the future. 
Rejecting Deviance as a Master Status 
Our observations indicate that the MHC team avoids the use of stigmatizing labels related to 
crime and mental health. The team never refers to individuals on the court docket as criminals, 
offenders, or defendants, but rather as participants. In addition, the judge uses several common 
discussion points that minimize participant’s identification as a deviant status. For example, 
rather than discuss the nature of any past criminal behavior, the judge often reports being proud 
of accomplishments and positive life changes, such as a new residence or job, then takes the time 
to discuss these events in open court. The judge commonly took notes on these conversations and 
would follow up with the participant about them in future court sessions. In addition, the birth 
date of each participant is noted on the court docket, and we observed the judge use this 
information several times to openly acknowledge birthdays and ask participants how they 
planned to celebrate. While such an exchange is brief, it indicates that the participant is seen as a 
whole person, not merely a criminal offender. 
Another method of rejecting deviance as a master status is the judge’s attention to the 
participant’s other status attributes. The judge consistently asks participants about family or 
romantic relationships, school, work, or even engages them in conversations about hobbies. 
When a participant’s family or friends attend court sessions, the judge explicitly acknowledges 
the attendance of the supporters, thanks them for their support, and brings them up to the front of 
the courtroom with the participant. In a few instances, the judge reviews the participant’s 
monthly report and asks the supporter if they had any words to add. We interpret the presence of 
supporters and the judge’s attention toward them as a contextualizing feature that recognizes the 
participant as part of a larger social unit. Even when friends and family did not attend, the judge 
often asks participants, “How does [name of loved ones] feel about your progress?” By 
continually calling attention to positive changes, social relationships, and a life outside of the 
courtroom, the judge is able to highlight status attributes that are not related to the deviant 
behavior that resulted in MHC participation. 
Ceremonial Decertifications of Deviance 
According to Braithwaite (1989), “[r]eintegrative shaming is shaming which is followed by 
efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community of law-abiding and respectable 
citizens through words or gestures of forgiveness or ceremonies to decertify the offender as 
deviant” (p. 101). The MHC graduation ceremony represents a clear example of reintegrative 
shaming. 
The graduation ceremony begins when the judge calls the name of each graduating participant at 
the beginning of the court session. As each participant approaches the bench, the judge leads the 
MHC team and others in the courtroom in applause before presenting the participant with a 
graduation certificate and shaking hands. The judge verbally congratulates the participant and 
gives a brief description of the progress she or he has made during the time with the court. 
Because the MHC participant is notified of graduation in the prior month court’s session, she or 
he is often accompanied by family and friends. In such cases, the judge acknowledges the 
attendance of the supporters, requests that they come to the front of the courtroom with the 
participant, and thanks them for their support. The judge then gives the supporters an opportunity 
to publicly congratulate the participant. Following this, the participant is asked whether she or he 
would like to address the court. The participant commonly thanks the judge and other team 
members, and sometimes gives words of advice to other participants in the audience. After the 
judge and participant completes their exchange, the ADA stands and publicly informs the 
participant and other observers that her or his criminal charges have been dropped. The judge 
follows by announcing that the participant is allowed to leave the courtroom. This is not a small 
gesture as it is the only time that the participant is not required to stay for the entire court session. 
The MHC graduation ceremony is a public display of support in that community representatives 
(i.e., the judge, court team, other participants and observers) recognize and applaud prosocial 
progress and forgive past deviance by disposing of criminal charges. Forgiveness is an important 
aspect of reintegrative shaming because it helps to create mutual bonds of respect between the 
offender and enforcer (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 140) as the participant learns that the MHC team is 
not there to simply monitor and sanction, but to help them reintegrate back into the community 
as an accepted law-abiding member. The MHC ceremony marks the end of the criminal justice 
process, as the participant is welcomed back into the community of law-abiding citizens by 
persons who represent that community (Braithwaite, 1989). MHC graduation also represents a 
culmination of a series of reintegrative events over several months, and while reintegrative 
shaming is primarily communicated to the participant by the judge, over these months the 
participant has received words of praise and encouragement and support from all of the MHC 
team members. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Restorative justice principles promote healing the harms associated with criminal offending. 
Problem-solving courts, such as MHC, encourage a restorative response to criminal offending. 
Rooted in the belief that mental illness may contribute to criminal offending, these courts take a 
non-adversarial approach emphasizing treatment and relationship (re)development. Although the 
ideology of MHCs is consistent with restorative justice principles, direct observations are 
necessary to identify the mechanisms that contribute to program success (or lack thereof). 
Our observations suggest that the MHC practices reintegrative shaming in ways that are 
consistent with the definitions set forth by Braithwaite and colleagues (Ahmed et al., 
2001; Braithwaite, 1989; Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). 
Consistent with prior research, we find that respect is largely accomplished during the 
interactions between the participant and judge (see Poythress et al., 2002; Ray et al., 2011; Wales 
et al., 2010) but that the organization of the MHC process also encourages instances of respectful 
disapproval. Specifically, by managing the flow of cases on the docket and making decisions 
prior to court proceedings, court officers use their time in court to develop relationships with the 
participants, which could explain extant research findings that all MHC personnel are vital parts 
in how defendants perceive of the process (see Canada & Gunn, 2013; Canada & Watson, 
2013; Castellano, 2011). Disapproving the behavior rather than the individual is consistently 
accomplished through interactions between the MHC judge and the participant. While the MHC 
team collectively determines noncompliance and sanctions prior to open court sessions, it is the 
judge who publicly delivers messages that recognize behaviors as deviant without labeling the 
offender. The court’s avoidance of stigmatizing labels and focus on positive present associations 
and relationships rather than past criminal acts and specific medical issues encourages a rejection 
of deviance as a master status. Finally, the MHC graduation ceremony signifies the end of the 
shaming process and incorporates expressions of forgiveness and acceptance back into the 
community. 
Our findings support Presser and Van Voorhis’s (2002) suggestion that dialogue, relationship 
building, and delivery of “moral” messages are crucial components to restorative justice 
programs. The MHC team members’ use of respectful language and gestures is a form of 
dialogue common in other restorative programs and functions to communicate the psychological, 
social, and material harms of criminal offending in an effort to encourage behavioral change 
among the participants. In addition, our observations reveal that the MHC is organized and 
implemented in a way that encourages the defendant to (re)build relationships with their family, 
friends, and other support networks, including the court personnel. Presser and Van Voorhis 
(2002) report that relationships are often established when one person offers concrete assistance 
to another. Such exchanges are a primary component of MHC as the court team members offer, 
provide, and monitor the participants’ health and well-being. What is more, the court team 
encourages participants to develop and maintain prosocial attitudes, which are expected to help 
them realize a deserving quality of life and commit to non-offending. 
Emphasizing these courts’ restorative justice potential could offer new directions for MHC 
operations. For example, the courts may consider more explicitly organizing proceedings around 
restorative justice principles, including centrally involving a “person-victim” (as opposed to the 
ADA acting as the state-victim representative) as well as the parties’ family, friends, or other 
supporters. Such inclusion could encourage looking beyond the criminal act, which may provide 
new opportunities to voice and experience a full range of emotions, promote acknowledgment, 
healing, and forgiveness, and ultimately successful reintegration back into the community. 
Although the present study contributes much to our understanding about the practice of 
reintegrative shaming within the restorative context of MHCs, some limitations should be noted. 
First, these findings are based on a single MHC setting and while this setting has the essential 
components of other MHCs, we do not suggest that all MHCs practice reintegrative shaming. 
Second, while reintegrative shaming may explain the reduced recidivism previously identified in 
this particular MHC setting (see Hiday & Ray, 2010; Moore & Hiday, 2006), we do not examine 
the extent to which reintegrative shaming techniques actually reduce recidivism, so this study 
cannot provide any authoritative conclusions about the effectiveness of reintegrative shaming. It 
could be that the participant’s access to treatment, services, monitoring, and other support 
measures are actually more influential in reducing recidivism than experiencing reintegrative 
shaming, and subsequent research should empirically inquire about this issue. 
Regardless of these limitations, the present study contributes to our knowledge and 
understanding about the processes and routine interactions in a MHC. Restorative justice is more 
than principles and beliefs; it is practice. Our data suggest that MHC’s restorative justice efforts 
are accomplished through reintegrative shaming. Additional studies using direct observation are 
crucial to continuing to advance our knowledge about restorative processes, and we hope that 
other researchers will employ this methodological technique to further examine mental health 
and other problem-solving courts. 
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Notes 
1.Scholars have also noted some of the limitations of restorative justice programs (e.g., Daly, 
2002, 2005; Van Ness, 1993; Weisberg, 2003; Young, 1990), but process-based investigations 
are important in uncovering these issues as well. 
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